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Abstract
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (BKK 1992) showed that if international capital markets are complete, con-
sumption growth correlations across countries should be higher than their corresponding output growth
correlations. In stark contrast to the theory, however, in actual data the consumption growth correlation
is lower than the output growth correlation. By assuming trade imperfections due to non-traded goods,
Backus and Smith (1993) showed that there is an additional impediment that works to lower the consump-
tion growth correlation. While Backus and Smith’s argument was successful in partially explaining the low
growth correlation puzzle, it contributed to generating another puzzle because the data forcefully showed
that consumption growth is negatively correlated with the real exchange rate, which is a violation of the
theory. In this paper, by decomposing the real exchange rate growth of the OECD countries into the nominal
exchange rate growth and the inflation diﬀerential, we find that nominal exchange rate movements are the
main source for the Backus-Smith puzzle. We find that the nominal exchange rate moves counter-cyclically
with consumption movements, which is a violation of the risk sharing theory with non-traded goods. We
also find that the violations are more pronounced when nominal exchange rate changes are larger in absolute
value . In contrast, the negative of bilateral inflation diﬀerentials is positively correlated with bilateral con-
sumption movements. The latter finding is in accordance with the theory. Furthermore, using intranational
data for the United States where the nominal exchange rate is constant, the Backus-Smith puzzle disappears,
although complete risk sharing is rejected.
JEL Codes: F31, F36, F37, E21, E32, E41, E44
Keywords: Risk Sharing, Exchange Rate
1 Introduction
An important issue in international economics is to measure the extent to which international
financial markets improve economic welfare by oﬀering opportunities to share risk across
countries. An influential paper by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (BKK 1992) showed that
if international capital markets are complete, country-specific technology shocks lead to
equilibrium consumption paths that are both less variable and less closely related to domestic
output than they are in closed economy real business cycle models. While quantitative
properties of the theoretical economy depend to a large extent on the specification and the
parameter values of the model, the theory suggests that the consumption growth correlation
across countries should be higher than output growth correlation.
In stark contrast to the theory, however, BKK found using data for 11 OECD
economies that the consumption growth correlation is actually lower than the output growth
correlation. This is referred to as one of the six major puzzles in international economics
and termed as international consumption correlation puzzle by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001).1
Since then there have been various attempts made to solve the puzzle, but none has been
thoroughly convincing. An important attempt, for example, is to introduce trade costs that
represent transport costs and other costs such as tariﬀs and other non-tariﬀ barriers.2 Backus
and Smith (1993), by introducing non-traded goods in the canonical model, demonstrate that
there is another wedge that works to lower consumption growth correlation: namely, when
1Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) initially called this as “quantity anomaly,” coupled with “price
anomaly” pointed out in the same paper. Recently Crucini (1999), Hess and Shin (2000) and Del Negro
(2002) extended the analysis to intranational data based on state level regional data in the U.S. and found
that the puzzle is preserved even within a country.
2Recently Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001) argue that by explicitly introducing trade costs of international
trade, one can go far toward explaining a great number of main empirical puzzles in international economics.
For the criticism of their view see also Engel (2001).
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real exchange rates are not constant, even complete risk sharing does not necessarily call for
perfectly synchronous movements in consumption growth.3 Rather, they demonstrate that
consumption growth is higher for countries that experience relative drops in the real price
of consumption because risk sharing implies that transfers should be made to countries that
can exploit lower prices.
While Backus and Smith’s theory was successful in lowering the theoretically pre-
dicted consumption growth correlation across countries, it contributed to generating an-
other puzzle because the data forcefully show that consumption growth co-moves with the
real exchange rate in the direction opposite to that predicted by theory.4 In this paper, by
decomposing the real exchange rate growth for OECD countries into nominal exchange rate
growth and the inflation diﬀerential, we shed new light on the Backus and Smith puzzle.
We find that nominal exchange rates move counter-cyclically with consumption movements,
contributing to a violation of the basic risk sharing theory with non-traded goods. However,
the negative of the bilateral inflation diﬀerentials is positively correlated with bilateral con-
sumption movements. Such a correlation indicates that if the nominal exchange rate did not
fluctuate, the movements of bilateral inflation alone could ensure the real exchange rate to
be positively correlated to bilateral consumption growth. In other words, the Backus-Smith
puzzle is mainly due to the atheoretical behavior of the nominal exchange rate.
To further confirm that the nominal exchange rate fluctuations contribute to the
Backus-Smith puzzle, we perform three experiments. First, we divide the sample into two
cases: one with large exchange rate changes and the other with small exchange rate changes.
3The importance of real exchange rate fluctuations on consumption risk sharing condition was initially
pointed out by Obstfeld (1989) and further analyzed in Kollman (1995).
4Ravn (2001) shows that variation of the utility function does not resolve the Backus and Smith puzzle.
In particular despite introducing non-separabilities in the utility function including eﬀects of money balances,
leisure, government spending, and habit persistence, the puzzle remains data of OECD countries.
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We find that the atheoretical behavior of the real exchange rate is present primarily when
nominal exchange changes are large.5 When nominal exchange changes are small, movements
of the nominal exchange rate as well as those of bilateral inflation diﬀerentials are consistent
with the theory. Overall our findings indicate that large changes in the nominal exchange
rate make it diﬃcult for consumption dynamics to conform to the theory.
Second, we attempt to examine if the Backus-Smith puzzle is due to existence of
incomplete risk sharing. We modify the model so that only portion of income risk is shared
across countries. The remaining portion is assumed not to be shared. In this simple setting,
we find mixed evidence: the Backus-Smith puzzle becomes less severe in the sense that
the real exchange rate is no longer countercyclical. However we continue to fail to find
statistically significant procyclical movements of the real exchange rate. When we decompose
the real exchange rate, even in the case of partial risk sharing, we find that the nominal
exchange rate is the major culprit that prevents the real exchange rate from being procyclical.
Third, in order to better understand the role of the nominal exchange rate, we follow
recent studies and re-examine the same issues across U.S. economic regions in the same
country. So-called intranational evidence provides a natural experiment for understanding
international puzzles since regions in the same country share the common currency and
hence the nominal exchange rate, though not the real one, is always equal to one. In this
case fluctuations of the real exchange rate are solely due to inflation diﬀerentials. Based on
data for 50 U.S. states, we find that while risk sharing is still somewhat limited, movements
of the real exchange rate are consistent with the risk sharing theory. This also confirms that
the existence of nominal exchange rate variation is mainly responsible for the existence of
5In this case, movements of bilateral inflation diﬀerentials as well as those of the nominal exchange rate
are inconsistent with the theory
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the Backus-Smith puzzle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is briefly
introduced. Section 3 reports the empirical analysis and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We start by deriving the equations that well be empirically investigated in the next section.
The theory is based on a simple set-up that is similar to Backus and Smith (1993). Consider
an endowment economy which consists of N countries indexed by i = 1, ..., N .6 Common
information at time t is represented by state zt that occurs with probability π(zt) ∈ [0, 1]
with
S
zt π(z
t) = 1 for all t. In each state the economy has N + 1 goods, a single traded
good and N non-traded goods associated with N countries.
Each country is inhabited by an infinitely lived, representative household whose pref-
erences are represented by the expected lifetime utility expressed as:
∞[
t=0
βt
[
zt
π(zt)U(Cit(z
t), Xit(z
t)) (1)
where Cit(z
t) denotes consumption in the ith country at time t, consisting of a composite good
made of the single traded good, CTit (z
t) and the non-traded good, CNit (z
t), Xit denotes all
non-consumption components including preference shocks that aﬀect utility and 0 < β < 1
is the subjective discount factor that is assumed to be the same across countries. We assume
that while traded goods are traded without costs, non-traded goods incur the infinite amount
of costs to trade. We denote the composite good by Cit = C(C
T
it , C
N
it ) and its price in the
local currency by Pit. We also assume that U is common to all countries, with the typical
6The assumption of an endowment economy is made solely for expositional simplicity; the main results
of the analysis are unchanged even if we model a production economy.
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regularity conditions.7 In a number of models in the literature that test international risk
sharing, it is common to assume that there is a single traded good that is consumed by
all countries. In a such a world, if prices are perfectly flexible, the bilateral real exchange
rate is equal to one all the time. However, a recent strand in the international economics
literature stresses the importance of heterogeneity of goods and stickiness of local prices.
One important implication of these changes is that the real exchange rate is no longer
instantaneously equal to one. Following this fashion, we allow the possibility of the real
exchange rate to move around, by introducing non-traded goods.
Suppose that complete contingent securities that are quoted in terms of the local
currency are also traded across countries without costs. In this case, the equilibrium with
complete risk sharing is made through pooling only tradable goods. In other words, the
equilibrium is obtained by the solution of the social planner’ problem as follows:
max
N[
i=1
λi
∞[
t=0
βt
[
zt
π(zt)U(C(CTit (z
t), CNit (z
t)), Xit(z
t)) (2)
subject to the resource constraints:
N[
i=1
CTit (z
t) ≤
N[
i=1
W Tit (z
t) (3)
CNit (z
t) ≤WNit (zt) (4)
where W Tit (z
t) and WNit (z
t) are endowments of the traded and non-traded goods in the ith
country in state zt at time t. The resource constraint (3) implies that the tradable good can
be distributed freely across countries whereas the resource constraint (4) implies that the
non-traded good should be consumed within country.
7Homotheticity of the utility function is suﬃcient for the existence of prices and the composite good such
that PTt C
T
it + P
N
it C
N
it = PitCit where P
T
t and P
N
it are prices of the tradable good and the non-traded good
in the country i in the local currency.
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It is straightforward to derive the optimal condition for the above problem and rep-
resent it in terms of the bilateral condition between any country pair (i, j) that is satisfied
in every state as follows:8:
β
Uc(Cjt+1, Xjt+1)
Uc(Cjt, Xjt)
= β
"ijt+1
"ijt
Uc(Cit+1, Xit+1)
Uc(Cit, Xit)
(5)
where "ijt is the bilateral real exchange rate between country i and j (the price of the
composite good in country j in terms of the composite good in country i) at time t.9 If
"ijt = 1 for all t, this condition reduces to the typical condition for international risk sharing
that states that real marginal rates of substitution are equalized across countries. This
condition posits that real marginal rates of substitution are diﬀerent across countries as long
as the real exchange rate changes.
Utilizing the definition of the real exchange rate, "ijt = eijt
Pjt
Pit
, where eijt is the
nominal exchange rate between country i and j (i.e., the price of country j currency in
terms of country i currency) at time t, we can rearrange equation (5) as follows:
β
Pjt
Pjt+1
Uc(Cjt+1, Xjt+1)
Uc(Cjt, Xjt)
= β
eijt
eijt+1
Pit
Pit+1
Uc(Cit+1, Xit+1)
Uc(Cit, Xit)
(6)
Equation (6) states that nominal marginal rates of substitution are equalized across countries.
Since the contingent securities that are traded without costs are quoted in local currencies,
complete risk sharing implies that the value of nominal currencies of equal value is the same
across countries.
To make it easier to empirically implement the model, suppose that the utility func-
tion is of the CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) form with a risk aversion coeﬃcient σ
8A similar condition has been derived by, among others, Obstfeld (1989), Backus and Smith (1995),
Kollmann (1995) and Raven (2001)
9From now on, to conserve on notation, we have suppressed the state zt in the equation.
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that is common across countries:
U(Cit) =
(CitX
γi
it )
1−σ
1− σ . (7)
where we also assume that the preference shocks aﬀect the utility in a multiplicative form
with the elasticity parameter, γi. Then equation (5) reduces to:
β
C−σjt+1X
γj(1−σ)
jt+1
C−σjt X
γj(1−σ)
jt
= β
"ijt+1
"ijt
C−σit+1X
γj(1−σ)
it+1
C−σit X
γj(1−σ)
it
(8)
Taking the logarithm in both sides of equation (8), we can derive the following equation:
∆ln(Cit+1) = ∆ln(Cjt+1) +
1
σ
∆ln("ijt+1) +
1
σ
(1− σ)(γi∆ln(Xit+1)− γj∆ln(Xjt+1)) (9)
Equation (9) demonstrates that if the real exchange rate is constant, ignoring non-consumption
shocks to utility, the growth rate of consumption is equalized across countries. Most previ-
ous studies on international risk sharing have ignored the second term as well as the third
term, and tested if the growth rate of consumption moves one for one across countries. Such
regressions, as mentioned above, find evidence of a severe violation of theory.10 Later studies
that tried to resuscitate the theory by explicitly considering the possibility of real exchange
rate movements faced another anomaly. According to equation (9), the consumption growth
diﬀerence between country i and j should be positively correlated to the real exchange rate.
To the contrary, however, Backus and Kehoe (1992) find that the consumption growth diﬀer-
ence between country i and j is negatively correlated to the real exchange rate in the data.
This is called the Backus-Smith puzzle.
10See, for example, Obstfeld (1989), Backus and Kehoe (1992), Canova and Ravn (1996) Lewis (1996),
Sorenson and Yosha (1998), Crucini (1999) and Hess and Shin (2000).
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3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we explore the evidence of risk sharing across countries. In particular, we
examine the relationship between consumption growth rates across countries and the growth
of their real exchange rate. As well, we decompose the movements in the real exchange into
the movements in the nominal exchange rate and the inflation diﬀerential between countries.
Our analysis of data for OECD economies and for state level data in the U.S. points to the
nominal exchange rate movements as a significant source of failure of the theory to match
the data.
3.1 Preliminary Analysis
Table 1 provides a number of summary statistics of the primary data of OECD economies
(1969-2000) used in our study. Each column of the table provides the mean and standard
deviation (in parentheses) of a variable of interest, while each row denotes a diﬀerent OECD
country in our sample. At the bottom of the table, we also report the pooled average and
standard deviation of the data. The variables presented in Table 1 are those that are key for
our analysis: namely, per-capita consumption growth (∆c), per-capita output growth (∆y),
CPI inflation (∆p), nominal exchange rate growth (∆e), and real exchange rate growth
(∆").11
There are a number of interesting findings presented in Table 1. First, consumption
and output growth averages to approximately 2.5 percent per year, although the standard
11Henceforth, ∆x ≡ log(xt) − log(xt−1). The CPI in this paper is more accurately the ”consumption
deflator”, derived by dividing nominal consumption by real consumption for each country and real exchange
rate data are obtained by deflating the nominal exchange rate by the CPI. The results for real exchange rate
data deflated by GDP deflator are qualitatively similar and hence not reported. For interested readers, see
the previous version of the paper that reports both results.
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deviation of consumption growth is generally larger than that for output growth.12 Second,
the nominal variation in prices and exchange rates is generally large relative to the variation
of real magnitudes. Indeed, the wide range of inflation experiences both within and across
countries is reflected in part in the wide range of exchange rate experiences both within
and across countries. Finally, the mean growth in nominal and real exchange rates for each
country appear unrelated.
Table 2 provides further summary statistics for the data, although this time based on
bilateral data. Again, each row denotes the data for a country while the column headings
provide the mnemonic for the particular data statistic. The first five columns provide the
pooled standard deviation of the bilateral series and country of interest, where a “x˜” indicates
a bilateral series, i.e. ∆x˜ = ∆log(xd) −∆log(xf ) where xd and xf are domestic and foreign
variables respectively. The final three columns provide pooled bilateral correlations of the
data series indicated: namely, ρ(x, y) is a country’s pooled correlation of variables x and y
using its bilateral data with all other countries in the sample. Again, as in Table 1, there are
a number of key features of the data that are apparent. First, consumption growth is more
volatile than output growth using the bilateral data.13 Second, the volatility of nominal
variables is large relative to that of real variables such as consumption and output growth.
Third, bilateral inflation movements are strongly positively correlated with nominal exchange
rate growth, though they are generally uncorrelated with real exchange rate growth. Finally,
12The fact that the standard deviation of consumption growth is larger than that for output growth
reflects, in part, that consumption measure in this paper includes nondurable component of consumption.
13This property is closely related to the BKK puzzle. This is easily understood from the following equa-
tion(s): var(∆yit − ∆yjt) = var(∆yit) + var(∆yit) − 2ρ(∆yit,∆yit) ∗
s
var(∆yit) ∗
s
var(∆yjt) (and the
equivalent equation for consumption growth). Since the consumption correlation across bilateral countries
is lower than that for output, the standard deviation of bilateral consumption diﬀerentials across countries
should be higher than that for bilateral output diﬀerential if the standard deviation of consumption growth
is not smaller than that of output growth and the correlation measures are low (i.e. less than 1/2).
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real and nominal exchange rate movements are very positively correlated at the annual
frequency.
The results in Table 3 provide evidence of the relationship between bilateral con-
sumption growth and inflation and exchange rate movements, which basically summarizes
the most important finding in the paper. In particular, the first column of results in the ta-
ble demonstrates that, generally speaking, real exchange rates move counter-cyclically with
consumption movements. In principle, this is a violation of basic risk sharing theory with
non-trade goods: as pointed out by Backus and Smith (1993), which is also denoted in
equation (9), whereby shocks that raise the real exchange rates should also raise bilateral
consumption growth. When we decompose the real exchange rate by ∆"t = ∆et−∆p˜t, how-
ever, we notice a very important finding. In column two, the nominal exchange rates move
counter-cyclically with consumption movements, contributing the violation of the basic risk
sharing theory. However, the last column of the table indicates that the negative of the bilat-
eral inflation diﬀerential is positively correlated with bilateral consumption movements. This
is true not only for the global average but also for every single OECD country considered in
the table. Such a correlation indicates that if the nominal exchange rate were constant, the
movements of bilateral inflation alone could conform to the theory of risk sharing by leading
the real exchange rate to be positively correlated to bilateral consumption growth. In other
words, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that the Backus-Smith puzzle should be mainly due
to the ill behavior of the nominal exchange rate.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
While Tables 1 through 3 provided a wide range of evidence about the properties of the data,
in this section we report evidence from the estimation of theory based equations. Recall that,
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as indicated in equation (9), the equation to be estimated is:
∆c˜it = β0 + β1 ·∆"it + ηit (10)
where ηit includes non-consumption preference shocks and other measurement errors.14 As
noted in section 2, according to the theory of complete risk sharing with traded goods only,
the coeﬃcient on β1 should be zero. In other words, with complete risk sharing, there should
be no predictable change in the growth of consumption across countries. In contrast, with
complete risk sharing with non-traded goods, only the coeﬃcient on β1 should be positive,
significant and equal to the reciprocal of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
The results in the top panel of Table 4 begin to provide the broad set of evidence
against complete international risk sharing with non-traded goods. For instance, the first
column of results indicates that when the data are pooled, the estimated coeﬃcient on β1
is significant and negative, which is completely at odds with the theory. The panel data
estimates, using both random eﬀects and fixed eﬀects, also confirm the findings that the
data are seriously at odds with the theory. The instrumental variables estimates, presented
in the two furthest columns on the right, provide weaker evidence of the rejection of the
theory: namely, both estimates of β1 are insignificantly diﬀerent from zero, though one is
still negative. Since the theory suggests that the coeﬃcient should be positive, the evidence
in the top panel of table indicates that the theory is unequivocally rejected by the data. 15
To further investigate this wide empirical departure from the theory, in the bottom
14Theoretically speaking, the equation does not necessarily include the constant term β0. The regression
results reported in the paper are robust to the inclusion of the constant term.
15The instruments used in these regressions are the lagged value of the dependent and explanatory vari-
ables. We have mixed evidence for the strength of the instrumental variables. The first-stage F statistics are
well above 20 in all estimates, indicating that the instruments are quite strong. However, the overidentifying
restrictions are generally rejected, showing that these variables may not be valid instruments. Of course,
this further indicates a departure from full risk sharing.
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panel of Table 4 we report the estimation results from the following specification:
∆c˜it = β0 + β11 ·∆eit − β12 ·∆p˜it + ηit (11)
Of course, specification (11) generalizes the theoretical specification (10) by expanding out
the terms of the real exchange rate into the nominal exchange and the inflation diﬀerential.
Note that we regain the earlier specification if β11 = β12. The results in bottom panel of Table
4 suggest that, overall, both the coeﬃcients on the exchange rate and the inflation diﬀeren-
tials are statistically significant and of the wrong sign! For instance, this is demonstrated
in the results for the panel regression, though the results using pooled data or instrumental
variables panel data in a few instances show either a positive and statistically significant
coeﬃcient on β11 or a negative and statistically significant coeﬃcient on β12. Overall, there
are three instances in the bottom panel of Table 4 where the estimated coeﬃcient on the
bilateral movements in inflation have the correct sign and are statistically significant. In
comparison, in one case is the coeﬃcient on the nominal exchange rate, β11, statistically
significant and of the correct sign, though in three cases it is statistically significant and of
the incorrect sign.16 Thus it would appear that the wide violation of complete risk sharing
is mainly due to the nominal exchange rate movements.
The results in Tables 5 expand on the regressions in Table 4 by re-estimation speci-
fications (10) and (11) over two distinct sub-samples of the data. To explore the idea that
large movements in the nominal exchange rate are responsible for the wide violations of
risk sharing, Table 5.A report estimates of these two specifications for time periods of small
16Note that for the IV panel data estimate using random eﬀects, the coeﬃcients on the two variables are
statistically significant and of the theoretically predicted sign. However, the estimate coeﬃcient implies a
coeﬃcient of risk aversion of over 17, which is likely to be implausibly high.
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movements in the nominal exchange rate, where a small movement is an annual change
(in absolute value) of less than 10 percentage points. In contrast, the results in Table 5.B
present the estimates for the sub-sample of large movements in the nominal exchange rate:
that is, periods where the nominal exchange rate moved in excess of 10 percentage points
(in absolute value) on an annual basis.
First consider the results in the top panel of Table 5.A, i.e. the ‘quiet’ exchange rate
period, when we consider the estimates of expression (10) using bilateral data. Interestingly,
the pooled estimate indicates the aforementioned problem that the estimates of β1 are sig-
nificant, though of the wrong sign. However, the panel estimates of β1 all indicate a positive
and statistically significant estimate for β1. As well, the IV estimates using this sample of
small exchange rate movements provide large, positive and statistically significant estimates
that are consistent with a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in the range of 3 to 4. However,
the results in Table 5.B where we estimate the specification using the sub-sample for large
exchange rate movements continue to be disappointing. Indeed, the coeﬃcients on β1 are all
statistically significant and all of the wrong sign!
Second, the bottom panels of Table 5.A and 5.B provide estimates of expression
(11) for sub-samples of small and large nominal exchange rate movements, respectively.
Generally, the results in the bottom panel of Table 5.A provide assurance that the theory
performs better when exchange rate movements are small. Note that estimates of β11 and
β12 are negatively and statistically significant for the pooling regression only and are positive
and statistically significant in many other cases. When exchange rate movements are large,
however, the coeﬃcient of β11 is always negative and statistically significant. Moreover, even
the coeﬃcient of β12 is negative and statistically significant in three out of five cases.
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While the results in Tables 4 through 5 demonstrate the weakness of the theory and
leave the impression that regimes with smaller movements in the nominal exchange rate are
somewhat more consistent with the theory, one may conjecture that the Backus-Smith puzzle
is due to partial risk sharing, i.e. only small portion of risk is shared across countries. Below,
we investigate this issue. Without cross country risk sharing, each country’s consumption
growth should track her output growth, which can be represented as follows:17
∆c˜it = γ0 + γ1 ·∆y˜it (12)
Now suppose that θ portion of consumption is realized by sharing risk across countries and
the remaining (1 − θ) portion is not, then the resulting consumption dynamics is obtained
by summing up mulitiplication of θ to (10) and mulitiplication of (1− θ) to (12):
∆c˜it = α0 + α1 ·∆"it + α2 ·∆y˜it + ηit (13)
where α0 = θβ0 + (1 − θ)γ0, α1 = θβ1 and α2 = (1 − θ)γ1. Equation (13) is generalization
of equation (10) that allows for any degree of partial risk sharing depending on the value
of θ. Of course, with complete risk sharing, the coeﬃcient on α2 should be zero (θ = 1),
as countries will consume out of joint resources rather than out of individual ones. The
inclusion of the output growth ratio as an additional explanatory variable to estimate the
portion of incomplete risk sharing has been used in many empirical tests of risk sharing (e.g.
Crucini (1999), Hess and Shin (2000), etc...).
The top and the middle panels of Table 6 provide estimates of expression (13). Strik-
ingly, whether the real exchange rate is included or not in the specification, the estimated
17We follow Crucini and Hess (2000) and Hess and Shin (2000) and assume that country consumption is
aﬀected by country income. Of course, if income follows a random walk, this specification indicates that
country’s consume out of their own permanent income.
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coeﬃcient of ∆y˜it is large, positive and statistically significant. Indeed, the estimates of the
coeﬃcient are in the range of .5 to .8, which is an extremely severe departure from complete
international risk sharing. However, in the middle panel, we find that the Backus-Smith
puzzle is considerablly weakened: namely that except for the pooling regression estimate,
the coeﬃcient of ∆"it is no longer significantly negative. It is not completely satisfactory,
though, in the sense that the coeﬃcient is not statistically positive, either.
Finally, in the bottom panel of Table 6, we decompose the real exchange rate in spec-
ification (13) into its nominal exchange rate and inflation components while also including
the output ratio as an explanatory variable, namely:
c˜it = α0 + α11 ·∆eit − α12 ·∆p˜it + α2 ·∆y˜it + ηit (14)
As before, the results are no more promising for the theory. As demonstrated by the estimates
for α2, the impact of country specific output on consumption is extremely large, significant
and positive, whereas theory predicts that it should be zero. And again, the results suggest
that the reason the coeﬃcient of the real exchange rate growth is not positive is mainly due
to the behavior of the nominal exchange rate. In four out of five instances, the coeﬃcients of
inflation diﬀerential are positive (of which three are statistically significant), while in three
out of five instances the coeﬃcients on the nominal exchange rate are negative (of which two
are statistically significant).
Clearly, support for the theory of complete risk sharing across countries is non-
existent. And the departures from completeness are large and systematic. Our results
suggest that the Backus-Smith puzzle should be closely related to existence of incomplete
risk sharing. At the same time, however, our findings also stress the importance of the
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nominal exchange rate movements that generate the Backus-Smith puzzle. In the following
section we examine some additional evidence within the United States. The value of this
contrast between international and intranational data is that while the former is subject to
exchange rate risk, the latter is not. See Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), Crucini
(1999), Hess and Shin (1998) and the contributions to Hess and van Wincoop (2000) as well
as others on the value of examining these diﬀerences.
3.3 Some Intranational Comparisons
In this sub-section, we explore some intranational evidence on risk sharing. Again, the benefit
to juxtaposing international and intranational data are that only the former is exposed
to exchange rate risk. The intranational data are from Del Negro (2002), who provides
consumption (as measured by retail sales), output (as measured by Gross State Product)
and price data (based on the CPI for cities) for the 50 United States. Data such as this is
standard in the Intranational Macroeconomics literature cited above.
Table 7 provides some useful summary evidence of the co-movement of variables
within and between countries. The first column of data reports the pooled cross correlation
for output growth across countries as well as the pooled cross correlation for consumption
growth across countries. According to the theory as originated by Backus, Kehoe and Kyd-
land (1992), countries that share risk should have consumption paths that are more correlated
than output paths. As is seen from the results in Table 2, however, this is clearly violated
in the international data, with the cross correlation of consumption being almost one-third
smaller than that for output. Moving to the second column, however, the intranational data
for the U.S. demonstrates that the cross correlations for both consumption and output are
much higher. Nevertheless, the cross correlation of consumption is about half as large as
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that for output, a serious violation of the theory which predicts that the latter should be
larger than the former.
Now we examine if the Backus-Smith puzzle remains in intranational data. The first
set of results are estimates of empirical specification (10) that are provided in Table 8. Of
course, since the bilateral nominal exchange rate across U.S. states is one, the measure
of the bilateral real exchange rate is just "it ≡ −∆pit + ∆pjt ≡ −∆p˜it. The estimation
results from the pooling and panel data estimates are quite encouraging, especially vis a
vis the international evidence provided above. The empirical estimates are positive and
statistically significant, with an implied value of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion equal
to approximately 2 to 4. Interestingly, the IV panel estimates are positive and fairly large,
on the order of about 2.
Finally, the results for empirical specification (13) that allows for incomplete risk
sharing are presented in Table 9. As before, in an environment of incomplete risk sharing,
controlling for country specific output movements is appropriate. The results indicate that
idiosyncratic movements in bilateral country output growth are significant predictors of
bilateral consumption growth rates. As such, this is a rejection of the theory of complete
risk sharing across countries.18 Nevertheless, the estimated coeﬃcients on output movements
are remarkably smaller for intranational data as compared to international data. As well, the
estimate coeﬃcients on real exchange rates, α1 are consistent with the theory and provide
reasonable estimates of the coeﬃcient of risk aversion. The results for the IV Panel estimates
are somewhat unusual by providing an estimated negative coeﬃcient on β2.
Our evidence based on the intranational data also suggests that if the nominal ex-
18See Del Negro (2002) for a similar assessment of the intranational versus international data.
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change rate is constant, the Backus-Smith puzzle disappears.
4 Conclusion
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (BKK 1992) showed that if international capital markets are
complete, consumption growth correlations across countries should be higher than their
corresponding output growth correlations. In stark contrast to the theory, however, in actual
data the consumption growth correlation is lower than the output growth correlation. By
assuming trade imperfections due to non-traded goods, Backus and Smith (1993) showed that
there is an additional impediment that works to lower the consumption growth correlation.
While Backus and Smith’s argument was successful in lowering the consumption growth
correlation, it contributed to generating another puzzle because the data forcefully showed
that consumption growth is negatively correlated with the real exchange rate, which is a
violation of the theory.
In this paper, by decomposing the real exchange rate growth of the OECD countries
into the nominal exchange rate growth and the inflation diﬀerential, we find that nominal
exchange rate movements are the main source of the Backus-Smith puzzle. We find that
the nominal exchange rate moves counter-cyclically with consumption movements, which is
a violation of the risk sharing theory with non-traded goods. In contrast, bilateral inflation
diﬀerentials are negatively correlated with bilateral consumption movements. The latter
finding is in accordance with the theory.
The evidence that the nominal exchange rate fluctuations contribute to the Backus-
Smith puzzle is corroborated by three additional experiments. First, we divide the sample
into sub-samples with large exchange rate changes and another with small exchange rate
18
changes, and find that the ill behavior of the real exchange rate is present primarily when
nominal exchange changes are large. Second, when we modify the model to allows for partial
risk sharing, the Backus-Smith puzzle becomes less severe, though it is still present. Again,
this puzzle is due to the fact that nominal exchange rate movements are still countercyclical
even after we introduce the possibility of partial risk sharing. In contrast, the negative of
inflation diﬀerential is strongly procyclical contributing to less severe violation of the theory.
Third, using data for 50 U.S. states, where the nominal exchange rate is constant, we find
that the Backus-Smith puzzle disappears even though risk sharing is still imperfect.
Overall, we believe that theory still faces two strong challenges. First, to explain why
international and intranational risk sharing is still incomplete. Second, to account for why
nominal exchange rate movements compound the theoretical violations of risk sharing rather
than ameliorate them.
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Table 1: Country Statistics (OECD Countries), 1969-2000
CNTRY ∆c ∆y ∆p ∆e ∆"
AUS .024 (.032) .018 (.018) .065 (.059) .021 (.082) .001 (.097)
AUT .033 (.041) .025 (.018) .039 (.023) -.018 (.109) -.012 (.106)
BEL .024 (.019) .024 (.019) .043 (.030) -.004 (.116) -.003 (.111)
CAN .018 (.021) .020 (.022) .050 (.031) .010 (.039) .005 (.040)
CHE .011 (.015) .010 (.022) .034 (.026) -.031 (.119) -.020 (.120)
DNK .022 (.055) .017 (.019) .060 (.036) .002 (.108) -.013 (.107)
ESP .023 (.046) .023 (.029) .089 (.066) .031 (.117) -.014 (.127)
FIN .024 (.027) .027 (.029) .065 (.043) .014 (.101) -.006 (.101)
FRA .026 (.039) .021 (.016) .057 (.040) .010 (.114) -.002 (.108)
GBR .024 (.019) .020 (.020) .073 (.050) .015 (.088) -.013 (.090)
GER .029 (.039) .020 (.016) .032 (.020) -.018 (.112) -.005 (.110)
GRC .029 (.029) .021 (.035) .127 (.061) .081 (.093) -.002 (.089)
IRL .033 (.043) .041 (.030) .078 (.055) .023 (.103) -.010 (.089)
ISL .038 (.066) .028 (.034) .194 (.171) .145 (.188) -.005 (.103)
ITA .026 (.051) .023 (.019) .090 (.055) .039 (.113) -.006 (.105)
JPN .031 (.027) .028 (.023) .038 (.043) -.039 (.108) -.032 (.110)
KOR .047 (.040) .058 (.038) .109 (.076) .044 (.105) -.020 (.099)
LUX .033 (.036) .032 (.033) .042 (.031) -.004 (.116) -.001 (.104)
MEX .014 (.040) .016 (.038) .262 (.211) .214 (.289) -.003 (.149)
NLD .026 (.043) .021 (.016) .040 (.028) -.013 (.110) -.008 (.110)
NOR .023 (.024) .029 (.018) .061 (.030) .007 (.082) -.009 (.083)
NZL .008 (.026) .010 (.027) .080 (.078) .029 (.098) -.006 (.120)
PRT .028 (.051) .032 (.037) .119 (.087) .065 (.121) -.009 (.100)
SWE .013 (.075) .017 (.020) .066 (.036) .018 (.104) -.002 (.101)
TUR .016 (.056) .022 (.044) .394 (.187) .360 (.238) .010 (.155)
USA .023 (.018) .021 (.021) .045 (.024) 0 (.) 0 (.)
AVE .025 (.041) .024 (.028) .091 (.111) .038 (.151) -.007 (.106)
Notes: Columns report the mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the series. All data
(except where noted) are from Penn-World data set, 1969-2000, including country code
mnemonics. The nominal exchange rate is defined as the number of units of the domestic
currency per unit of the U.S. dollar. The price series used is the CPI index that is derived by
deviding nominal consumption by real consumption. AVE is the Average of the entire data of 832
observations. CNTRY refers to county. ∆c and ∆y are annual per capita growth of real
consumption and real GDP (log changes), respectively, from the national accounts. ∆p is the
annual inflation rate measured by the CPI index and ∆e is the annual growth rate of the nominal
exchange rate. ∆ is the annual growth rates of the real exchange rate (log changes). Note that
∆ = ∆e+∆pf −∆pd where f refers to the foreign country and d refers to the domestic country.
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Table 2: Bilateral Volatility Statistics (OECD Countries), 1969-2000
CNTRY ∆c˜ ∆y˜ ∆p˜ ∆e ∆" ρ(∆p˜,∆e) ρ(∆p˜,∆") ρ(∆e,∆")
AUS .051 .031 .117 .153 .110 .713 .101 .714
AUT .053 .030 .110 .140 .086 .795 .079 .640
BEL .042 .028 .110 .139 .088 .787 .068 .639
CAN .044 .030 .108 .153 .110 .702 .045 .720
CHE .041 .031 .112 .147 .098 .761 .055 .665
DNK .064 .030 .110 .138 .084 .796 .071 .630
ESP .057 .035 .117 .142 .093 .725 -.005 .629
FIN .046 .035 .110 .143 .096 .774 .073 .658
FRA .054 .028 .108 .140 .089 .791 .093 .655
GBR .043 .030 .111 .144 .098 .760 .025 .644
GER .055 .028 .112 .142 .090 .791 .066 .632
GRC .046 .039 .115 .137 .085 .804 .008 .563
IRL .056 .039 .114 .141 .086 .799 .061 .608
ISL .074 .039 .175 .200 .100 .884 .233 .617
ITA .059 .029 .110 .145 .093 .780 .089 .667
JPN .047 .033 .113 .162 .117 .689 .042 .734
KOR .055 .045 .123 .176 .125 .689 .046 .735
LUX .051 .039 .110 .139 .089 .800 .081 .591
MEX .056 .045 .228 .325 .185 .827 .262 .750
NLD .057 .028 .112 .140 .087 .785 .036 .622
NOR .049 .033 .110 .133 .083 .808 .029 .548
NZL .047 .037 .114 .148 .101 .700 -.017 .639
PRT .062 .039 .124 .148 .089 .791 .127 .638
SWE .084 .031 .109 .140 .089 .789 .085 .651
TUR .069 .052 .219 .251 .141 .782 -.056 .535
USA .043 .030 .109 .152 .108 .716 .057 .717
Ave .056 .036 .152 .185 .103 .830 .084 .595
Notes: See Table 1. For country d (domestic) and f (foreign), ∆x˜ ≡ ∆log(xd)−∆log(xf ) for
x = c, y, p: namely, it is the diﬀerence between country ds and f s growth rate of variable x. The
nominal exchange rate is defined as the number of units of the domestic currency per unit of
foreign currency. Volatility is measured as the pooled standard deviation of country d’s bilateral
data with all other countries. ρ(x, y) is country d’s pooled correlation of variables x and y using
its bilateral data with all other countries.
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Table 3: Correlation with Consumption Ratio
CNTRY ρ(∆c˜,∆") ρ(∆c˜,∆e) ρ(∆c˜,−∆p˜)
AUS -.046 -.244 .277
AUT .006 -.114 .149
BEL -.052 -.140 .137
CAN -.063 -.154 .154
CHE -.012 -.132 .163
DNK -.004 -.127 .156
ESP .078 -.161 .261
FIN -.218 -.247 .142
FRA -.113 -.135 .084
GBR -.060 -.192 .197
GER -.056 -.109 .094
GRC -.065 -.235 .235
IRL -.004 -.162 .198
ISL -.250 -.310 .221
ITA -.093 -.153 .124
JPN .018 -.107 .172
KOR -.367 -.393 .180
LUX -.115 -.164 .120
MEX -.548 -.550 .334
NLD -.121 -.178 .128
NOR -.066 -.182 .174
NZL -.112 -.238 .186
PRT -.120 -.300 .270
SWE .184 .054 .076
TUR .113 -.139 .240
USA -.205 -.249 .148
AVE -.098 -.174 .163
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2. ρ(x, y) is country d’s pooled correlation of variables x and y using its
bilateral data with all other countries.
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Table 4: Real Exchange Decomposition Regression
∆c˜it = β0 + β1 ·∆"it + ηit
Panel IV Panel
Pooling Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
∆" -.073** -.052** -.049** .000 -.024
[.003] [.005] [.005] [.025] [.022]
R2 .04 .01 .01 .02 .03
∆c˜it = β0 + β11 ·∆eit − β12 ·∆pit + ηit
∆e -.073** -.051** -.053** .057* .036
[.003] [.005] [.005] [.024] [.021]
−∆p˜ -.023** .024** .068** .058* -.001
[.004] [.007] [.007] [.024] [.021]
R2 .08 .04 .06 .01 .04
OBS 10050 10050 10050 8425 8425
Notes: See Tables 1-3. Estimated standard errors are in square brackets. R2 is the standard
r-squared from the regression. OBS is the number of observations. Pooling regressions also
include a constant (not shown). Instruments include the lagged value of the dependent variable
and the explanatory variables.
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Table 5: Real Exchange Regression: Small vs. Large Exchange Movements
A. Small Exchange Movements
∆c˜it = β0 + β1 ·∆"it + ηit
Panel IV Panel
Pooling Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
∆" -.034** .088** .102** .252** .272**
[.006] [.010] [.010] [.063] [.070]
R2 .01 .02 .02 .01 .01
∆c˜it = β0 + β11 ·∆eit − β12 ·∆pit + ηit
∆e -.040** .011 -.002 .592** .464**
[.008] [.014] [.014] [.142] [.143]
−∆p˜ -.030** .139** .182** .025 .056
[.007] [.012] [.013] [.040] [.044]
R2 .01 .03 .03 .01 .01
OBS 6581 6581 6581 5261 5261
Notes: See Table 4. The data are censored so that observations where the annual log change in
the nominal exchange rate exceeds 10 percent are removed.
B. Large Exchange Movements
∆c˜it = β0 + β1 ·∆"it + ηit
Panel IV Panel
Pooling Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
∆" -.091** -.083** -.082** -.124** -.122**
[.005] [.007] [.007] [.024] [.023]
R2 .09 .04 .04 .04 .05
∆c˜it = β0 + β11 ·∆eit − β12 ·∆pit + ηit
∆e -.082** -.079** -.082** -.064** -.060**
[.005] [.007] [.007] [.022] [.022]
−∆p˜ -.035** -.006 .019 -.054* -.108**
[.006] [.009] [.010] [.023] [.026]
R2 .13 .09 .08 .08 .07
OBS 3469 3469 3469 3164 3164
Notes: See Table 4. The data are censored so that observations where the annual log change in
the nominal exchange rate less than or equal to 10 percent are removed.
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Table 6: Output Ratio Estimation
∆c˜it = φ0 + φ1 ·∆y˜it + ηit
Panel IV Panel
Pooling Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
∆y˜ .758** .693** .680** .877** .753**
[.006] [.014] [.015] [.077] [.163]
R2 .59 .20 .18 .19 .17
∆c˜it = α0 + α1 ·∆"it + α2 ·∆y˜it + ηit
∆y˜ .738** .689** .677** .819** .537**
[.006] [.014] [.015] [.076] [.141]
∆" -.049** -.007 -.006 .033 .002
[.002] [.005] [.005] [.023] [.022]
R2 .62 .20 .18 .19 .19
∆c˜it = α0 + α11 ·∆eit − α12 ·∆pit + α2 ·∆y˜it + ηit
∆y˜ .729** .663** .623** .759** .644**
[.006] [.014] [.016] [.074] [.128]
∆e -.049** -.008 -.012* .092** ..074**
[.002] [.005] [.005] [.023] [.021]
−∆p˜ -.038** .028** .055** .075** .002
[.003] [.006] [.007] [.022] [.020]
R2 .62 .21 .19 .14 .09
OBS 10050 10050 10050 8425 8425
Notes: See Table 4.
Table 7: Consumption Correlation Puzzle
International Intranational
ρ(yit, yjt) .174 .392
ρ(cit, cjt) .062 .183
OBS 10,050 25725
Notes: See Tables 1 and 3. ρ(x, y) is the pooled cross correlation of variables x and y using
bilateral data for all countries or U.S. states. Intranational data are for U.S. States, 1969-1990.
GSP data and Consumption (i.e. Retail Sales ) data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
State level CPI indices are from Del Negro (2002).
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Table 8: Real Exchange Regression: US States (1969-1990)
∆c˜it = β0 + β1 ·∆"it + ηit
Panel IV Panel
Pooling Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
∆" .508** .246** .268** 2.181** 1.855**
[.028] [.033] [.035] [.242] [.276]
R2 .01 .002 .003 .003 .003
OBS 25725 25725 25725 19600 19600
Notes: See Tables 5 and 7. Note that for US State data, ∆it = −∆p˜it.
Table 9: Output Ratio Estimation: US States (1969-1990)
∆c˜it = α0 + α1 ·∆"it + α2 ·∆y˜it + ηit
Panel IV Panel
Pooling Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
∆y˜ .174** .131** .121** -.784** -.963**
[.006] [.007] [.007] [.109] [.095]
R2 .03 .01 .01 .02 .02
∆c˜it = α0 + α11 ·∆eit − α12 ·∆pit + α2 ·∆y˜it + ηit
∆y˜ .167** .127** .117** .292** -.185**
[.006] [.007] [.007] [.067] [.069]
∆" .453** .192** .220** .380* .872**
[.027] [.033] [.034] [.191] [.214]
R2 .04 .01 .01 .03 .01
OBS 25725 25725 25725 19600 19600
Notes: See Table 8.
29
